Identity is helpful. Until it isn’t.

Neurodivergence isn’t a clinical entity. It lumps together profoundly different conditions under a single name. But this problem isn’t unique to neurodivergence. Psychiatric diagnoses themselves are largely syndromic rather than etiological: they describe clusters of observable signs and symptoms without a single underlying cause. Major depressive disorder, ADHD, and autism are pattern-based categories, not disease entities in the way tuberculosis or multiple sclerosis are.

This is because humans naturally create categories to organize continuous variation. Generations are a good example. There is no biological event that makes someone born in 1981 a Millennial and someone born in 1980 Gen X. Yet people recognize themselves in these identities. Personality categories are similar. There is no natural dividing line between introvert and extrovert, only a spectrum. These divisions persist because they are narratively useful and organize our experience, even when the categories themselves are merely imputed.

This tension is playing out visibly in debates about autism. Some people understand autism primarily as a discrete and profoundly disabling developmental disorder. Others experience it as an identity that helps explain their differences, reduces shame, and stabilizes their sense of self. Both reflect different experiences tied to the same name, and that overlap creates much of the confusion.

While I agree that categories like neurodivergence obscure important differences, the deeper issue for me is not that these identities exist. It’s that all human identities are built this way. That usually isn’t a problem, until the label begins to eclipse the underlying experience, displacing the reality it was meant to describe.